

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 1 March 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A. ABERRA

(Ethiopia)

STATE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO
Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS
Mr. C. H. PAULINO PRATES

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. D. POPOV
Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
Mr. S. F. RAE
Mr. C. J. MARSHALL
Mr. P. D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. R. KLEIN

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABERRA
Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. B. ASSFAW
Mr. A. MIKHAEL

India:

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI
Mr. K. P. LUKOSE
Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO
Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. G. O. IJEWERE

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. F. STANIEWSKI
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI
Mrs. H. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. N. IECOBESCU
Mr. C. UNGUREANU
Mr. A. CORCIANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. U. ERICSSON
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. O. A. GRINEVSKY
Mr. G. K. EFIMOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALUAF
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. A. A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT
Sir Harold BEELEY
Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON
Mr. M. J. F. DUNCAN

United States of America:

Mr. A. S. FISHER
Mr. C. H. TIMBERLAKE
Mr. G. BUNN
Mr. D. S. MACDONALD

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): I declare open the two hundred and forty-fourth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

On behalf of the Committee I should like to welcome back to our meetings Mr. Protitch, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and Mr. Fisher, the new leader of the United States delegation.

I should like to read out the following proposal by the co-Chairmen:

"The co-Chairmen wish to propose to the Committee a schedule of work for the next several meetings, in accordance with the decisions taken at the 235th (ENDC/PV.235, p.11) and 240th (ENDC/PV.240, p.4) meetings. They propose that the present meeting and the next meeting, the 245th, should be devoted to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; that the 246th and 247th meetings, on 8 and 10 March, should be devoted to discussion of other collateral measures; that the 248th meeting, on 15 March, should be devoted to discussion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament; that the 249th meeting, on 17 March, should also be devoted to that question if there are representatives wishing to speak on the subject on that day; and that after this discussion of general and complete disarmament in one or two meetings discussion on non-proliferation should be resumed for some meetings as previously agreed".

If there is no objection, I shall declare that this proposal is adopted.

It was so decided.

Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom): I should like to begin by echoing your welcome, Mr. Chairman, to Mr. Protitch, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, whom we are delighted to see here again; and also to Mr. Fisher, leading the United States delegation for the first time at this session.

I am sorry that I was not here to listen to the many thoughtful and constructive speeches made during the last two weeks by representatives of the non-aligned Governments. As the Committee knows, the reason for my absence was that I accompanied my Prime Minister on an official visit to Mr. Kosygin in Moscow. Our talks there were of very great interest, especially to us in our work here, and they were held in the atmosphere of warm hospitality which is so typical of

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our Russian friends. I have of course read with very close attention the speeches that I missed during my absence, and I should like during my remarks this morning to discuss some of the points made in them.

I shall say only a few general words on the subject of non-proliferation, because I profoundly agree with the view expressed by a number of representatives that the time has really come to stop talking in generalities and begin instead to examine, article by article, the two draft treaties (ENDC/152, 164) that lie on the table. But I think that it might be useful, before we do this, to try once more to clear away what I believe are certain obvious misconceptions about the United States draft, and also to try to persuade the representative of the Soviet Union to throw a little more light on some of the implications of his draft.

Before I do that I should like to refer to the most interesting speech made by the representative of India on 15 February. It contained a remark which my delegation fully supports. Mr. Trivedi said:

"There must be an end to all this talk of a high table or a top table, a select club, centres of nuclear power and a superior coterie or a group of four or five who could meet among themselves and work out the salvation of the world". (ENDC/PV.240, p.14)

My Government has done its best to expose the fallacy of such a conception. It is true that ever since the search for agreement on a non-proliferation treaty began, its form has been conceived as falling into two parts, enjoining, first, obligations on States possessing nuclear weapons and, second, obligations on States not possessing them. The division of signatories into two classes cannot, by the very nature of this situation, be avoided: nor, therefore, can the difference between the two kinds of obligation.

This distinction is maintained in the wording of United Nations resolution 2028 (XX) (ENDC/161), which the representative of Mexico aptly described on 22 February as our pentologue (ENDC/PV.242, p.11). As the representative of the United States said in his speech on 17 February:

"The essence of a non-proliferation treaty is the distinction between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon States. While it is in the interests of both to contribute toward the common goal of non-proliferation, by the very nature of the problem the contributions

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from nuclear weapon countries will have to be of a different nature from those of non-nuclear weapon countries." (ENDC/PV.241, p.37)

But, as Mr. Foster went on to point out, this distinction is not a new one. It was already present when we signed the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) in 1963. And I think it is worth recalling that it was then the nuclear weapon States which accepted the greater burden -- indeed, one might say the more real and immediate restrictions; it was then the non-nuclear weapon States which accepted obligations that one might reasonably call merely theoretical. I hasten to add that this distinction in obligation was in no way due to altruistic motives on either side. Both nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States did this because, as Mr. Foster said

"... such a treaty was in their own interests and in the interests of mankind in general, even though an element of discrimination might be said to have existed and even though not all atmospheric testing stopped". (ENDC/PV.241, p.38)

It is true that the obligations directly related to a non-proliferation treaty must appear to weigh most heavily on those non-nuclear weapon States which have within sight the capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons of their own; not so heavily on the present nuclear weapon States; and least of all, I would suggest, on those States which do not have the capacity, or feel the need, to consider manufacturing or acquiring these weapons.

Let us be quite frank in considering this question of discrimination and of self-interest. Let us acknowledge that there is a factor of discrimination which arises from the very existence of the problem. This may not be an ideal situation -- it is very seldom in international affairs that we are confronted by an ideal situation -- but let us consider what the alternative may be. I said a moment ago, in speaking of the partial test-ban Treaty, that neither the nuclear weapon States nor the non-nuclear weapon States were acting from altruistic motives. The same is true today.

Can anyone here seriously suggest that it would be more in the interests of any one of us so to concentrate our discussions on the attainment of an agreement which might solve many of our problems at once that in the inevitably long process of achieving it we should miss the opportunity of solving the most urgent and threatening of the problems which confront us? An agreement to stop

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the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other States, for which resolution 2028 (XX) called, may not be the answer to all the problems of armament and disarmament, and may contain certain elements of discrimination. But if we consider the likely future development of the world with no treaty at all to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, can anyone hesitate in agreeing that, whatever the imperfections, a treaty soon would be immeasurably better than no treaty at all?

In the words of a man who bore heavy responsibility at a time of crucial importance for the entire world, the late President Kennedy:

"I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in many hands -- in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered through the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security and no chance of effective disarmament. There would only be increased chances of accidental war ...". (ENDC/102, p.5)

I have quoted those words of President Kennedy before, but I think them eminently worth quoting again.

I should like at this point to make one general observation on the searching speech made at the last meeting (ENDC/PV.243) by the representative of Sweden, a speech which I read with very great interest. I agree with her that, in concentrating on some of the vexed questions which have arisen from the different draft texts and on the differences of opinion which they reveal, we may have spent too little time on other equally vital points and made too cursory an analysis of them. My delegation listened with interest to her exposition of the different stages which various countries have reached in the nuclear process, of the many rungs of the ladder, as she put it, and of the difficulty of drafting a treaty which would meet the legitimate needs of all States involved at their different degrees of nuclear development.

I believe there is one danger which we must guard against here. We cannot hope to deal in a non-proliferation treaty, which must be a simple document, with all the problems of security, all the difficulties with regard to nuclear weapons, which beset each country in the world, however near or far that country may be from a capacity to manufacture these weapons. I still believe that the

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only way we are going to achieve a treaty is by drawing the line below the present nuclear weapon States. That basic division is the important one, however many subdivisions one may see within it.

Mrs. Myrdal referred to the three States which have a nuclear weapon capability, apart from the two super-Powers; and she questioned the arguments for their retaining national control of nuclear weapons. I cannot, of course, answer for the other governments which might be included in this category; but I can assure the Committee that, as my Prime Minister told the House of Commons on 25 January:

"We are seeking, on terms which will stop the spread of nuclear weapons, to have the so-called independent British deterrent internationalized within the Alliance."

That is no easy task, but it is not one which should hold up our negotiations for a non-proliferation treaty.

I agree with Mrs. Myrdal's suggestion, made later in her speech (ENDC/PV.243, pp.11 et seq.), that we may have to give further thought to the point in the chain of the nuclear process at which we should impose controls; but I believe that if we failed to draw one clear line between the two classes of States, the nuclear weapon States and the non-nuclear weapon States, we should be lost. If we try to change the status of nations at present in one category and try to put them in the other just for the sake of achieving a tidy treaty, we shall come up against immovable obstacles. I believe that we should concentrate on concrete proposals that have a chance of securing acceptance by everybody concerned, however imperfect they may be, rather than allow ourselves to become too engrossed in detailed analysis and subtle classifications.

I must confess that I have some sympathy for the Mogul emperor whose deplorable edict the representative of India set before us. It must, of course, be horrible to be a slave to drink; it must be extremely difficult to abandon the habit. I can picture this tortured monarch, beset by delirium tremens but still concerned for his subjects' welfare and only too aware of the dangers of the bottle and of the condition his kingdom would fall into if all his people caught his own affliction. "Do as I say, not as I do" is a logically indefensible precept, but in an imperfect world it may be a necessary one for a particular short period of history.

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There is a further problem, mentioned by several other speakers, the reality of which we certainly recognize. It is the problem of guarantees. We have been interested in the views which some non-aligned nations have already expressed, and I very much hope that others will not hesitate to set out their own thoughts for us on the subject of guarantees. We shall have to take account of those views in our deliberations when everybody concerned has made his opinions known. I think two particularly important suggestions already made are those of President Johnson in his message of 27 January (ENDC/165), and Chairman Kosygin in his message of 1 February (ENDC/167).

I would add that it is the hope of my delegation that once a non-proliferation treaty has been signed it will be possible, in the improved international atmosphere which its signature must generate, to go on to negotiate without much delay further agreements to bring about a real reduction in the armaments of all countries. Both sides, West and East, have submitted proposals for such measures.

The non-aligned members of the Conference will have a vital part to play in reconciling the differences between the proposals made by each side. Here the tables will be turned again, since it will be the most powerful States, militarily speaking, the nuclear weapon States, which will at that stage have to make the greatest sacrifices. But there is, as I have already suggested, one point to which my delegation -- and I believe most other delegations here -- attaches the greatest importance. I believe that it would be irresponsible to try to make a non-proliferation treaty dependent on those other and further measures.

I scarcely need to point out to my colleagues here, many of whom have been engaged in these negotiations far longer than I have, how difficult it is to reach any -- and I stress the word "any" -- agreement on disarmament among sovereign nations, each responsible for its own national security; and that difficulty will be enormously increased if we try to deal with more than one subject at a time or make agreement on one conditional on agreement on others. In all this I seem to detect a belief that it is possible to turn back the arms race without first stopping it. This, as everybody will know, is contrary to the principles of simple mechanics, so it is surely hardly likely to be possible in the far more complicated business of politics.

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As I said at the beginning of these remarks, my delegation is delighted to see a move to get down to the business of going through the draft treaties article by article. The representative of the Soviet Union in his speech on 17 February went over the first two articles of the Soviet draft and commented on the equivalent articles put forward in the United States draft. Once again, in those comments, he betrayed what is in my view a complete misunderstanding of the Western position and of the intention of the United States draft. We do not propose, as Mr. Tsarapkin said, to "give control over these weapons to a multilateral nuclear force or other combined nuclear force of a military alliance." (ENDC/PV.241, p.27). We do not propose that. None of the various proposals under discussion in NATO would allow the control of nuclear weapons to pass into the hands of anyone who does not at the moment have that control. I believe that that fact cannot be repeated too often.

It is the contention of my Government that, so long as such control does not pass, proliferation has not taken place. The Western delegations have explained what proliferation means in their view -- and it is a straightforward, common-sense definition: proliferation occurs when a non-nuclear weapon State or group of such States acquires its own independent capability to fire nuclear weapons, without the explicit and concurrent decision of a nuclear-weapon State. That has been said in various forms before, and I put it forward again as a simple common-sense definition of proliferation.

The Soviet use of the word "access", on the other hand, raises, for us, considerable problems of ambiguity. What exactly does it mean? The representative of Czechoslovakia suggested on 22 February that there was no need to define that term precisely, since the wording of the Soviet draft articles I and II was self-explanatory. Mr. Cernik further stated on 22 February:

"First, there can be no doubt that a non-proliferation treaty is not aimed at the dissolution of existing military alliances. Nor is its purpose to interfere in the activity or internal affairs of these alliances ...". (ENDC/PV.242, p.31)

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My delegation welcomes that statement. But the representative of the Soviet Union said on 17 February:

"The main shortcoming of the United States draft treaty, and a very dangerous one, is that it leaves open the possibility of non-nuclear States participating in nuclear weapons through the NATO military alliance".

(ENDC/PV.241, p.33)

That statement could be read to imply a considerable degree of interference in the legitimate workings of NATO, and indeed of any alliance that contains nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. In any military alliance, plans must be prepared for the troops of the member nations to fight side by side. That is what an alliance is about. But in our view this would not involve proliferation unless governments other than those of the present nuclear weapon States were able to order the use of nuclear weapons.

It has also been suggested (ENDC/PV.240, p.16) that the plans of the Western Alliance for co-operation within NATO would create a third, a privileged, class of States. I do not believe that this is correct. We have been able at this Conference -- especially at this Conference -- to form a clear picture of the theory of non-alignment and of the way in which the non-aligned countries seek to preserve their independence and national integrity; but other nations with the same end in view, faced with a threat that they have good reason to believe to be real, have chosen a different policy that of alliance with other like-minded nations. As the representative of Italy said on 24 February:

"... in fact the question is not one of discrimination but of a difference -- a difference which lies in the very essence of the unaligned and which is the result of a choice freely made. It is even a difference to which the unaligned countries are very attached, and of which they are very jealous. This difference will remain until the process of disarmament makes alliances useless and purposeless and until the balance now ensured by alliances -- a balance which is also to the advantage of the unaligned -- is established by different and better means than by armaments." (ENDC/PV.243, p.26)

I know that the non-aligned countries would be the last to deny the right of a State to choose between the two policies, of alignment and non-alignment. There is

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no special privilege here. Having taken this decision to entrust the security of their nations to an alliance, it is only natural for the governments concerned to want to bind those alliances together as closely as possible. In the end, the aim of all disarmament and arms control is to make military alliances unnecessary -- and this is our final aim here. But until this point is reached it is surely natural, especially in the circumstances still prevailing in Central Europe, which has been the cockpit of so many disastrous wars, that members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should want to have some say in the use of the forces of that alliance.

Some members of NATO, like one member of the Warsaw Pact, are States controlling nuclear weapons. Is it unreasonable that the collective forces of NATO should include nuclear weapons to match those deployed against the alliance? And is it unreasonable that the governments of those countries in the alliance which do not possess nuclear weapons should wish to be consulted on matters concerning those weapons -- some stationed on their soil, with their full agreement, to protect them? This is not to say that they have control of these weapons or that there is any question of their acquiring control of them.

I have said before that it may be that there is a difference of view between the Western and the Eastern European States on the nature and function of alliances. The Western view is bound up with the concept of sharing -- the sharing of costs, of responsibilities, of weapons and of forces. The fact that control of the nuclear weapons must not pass to the non-nuclear members makes it all the more important that these members should have a proper voice in the policies and strategies of the alliance, in keeping with their dignity as free and sovereign States. Possibly the members of the Warsaw Pact do not feel the same close concern for the plans of their alliance as we do in the West -- although, frankly, I would be very surprised if they did not. But even if they do have a different concept of what an alliance means, that is not to say that ours is necessarily wrong.

Finally, I should like to make one general remark about the work of this Committee. I believe that it is most important, because of the urgency of the task assigned to us by the United Nations General Assembly, to stick to matters within our competence. Disputes and tensions between Powers represented at this table, and even more those involving Powers outside the Conference and even outside

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the United Nations, are bound to make the process of negotiation here more difficult, as they increase tension and mutual suspicion between the Powers represented here.

Of course, we all want them to be tackled and solved. The representative of India, in a part of his speech on 15 February (ENDC/PV.240, p.8) with which my delegation fully agreed, referred to the spirit of Tashkent. The Government of the Soviet Union played a part in reaching this settlement which we can all admire, and which we do admire. We would wish that all disputes could be tackled in the same way. There is no doubt that a settlement of the tragic war in Viet-Nam would, by reducing tension between Powers represented here, make our task easier. But this Conference has no mandate to settle that problem. If any of the Governments represented here want to make representations about Viet-Nam, then they can make those representations in the proper quarter. But let us not waste the time -- the precious time -- of this Conference by playing the old one-sided record over and over again.

Again, the peaceful settlement of the German problem, which my Government believes must be achieved through free elections leading to reunification, would make our task here easier. The Federal Republic of Germany is not represented at this table, and no purpose is served by the representative of the Soviet Union, or representatives of other members of the Warsaw Pact, trotting out the same old rigmarole of suspicion and distortion of the policies of that Government. Most of the countries represented at this table suffered directly or indirectly from the war started by Hitler in prosecution of the aggressive aims of the Third Reich, which my own country was one of the first to resist. The Soviet Union has no monopoly of suffering in this respect.

But it is simply nonsense to suggest that the Government of the Federal German Republic pursues similar policies. It has committed its armed forces entirely to the military command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; it has renounced the use of force for the attainment of political objectives and expressed its desire to settle the German frontier question by peaceful negotiation only; and it has voluntarily pledged itself not to manufacture atomic weapons on its soil. I believe that the representative of the United States spoke for almost all the members of this Committee when he said on 17 February (ENDC/PV.241, p.39) that he was bored with the tiresome repetition of these unfounded accusations. Let us now get on with our real work.

Mr. CORREA do LAGO (Brazil): First, I wish to extend the welcome of the Brazilian delegation to Mr. Protitch and Mr. Fisher, who are again with us in this Committee.

Seldom has a group of nations been asked to perform such an urgent and grave task as the one entrusted to this Committee by resolution 2028 (XX) (ENDC/161) of the General Assembly. The messages received from His Holiness Pope Paul VI (ENDC/163), from President Johnson (ENDC/165) and from Prime Ministers Wilson (ENDC/166) and Kosygin (ENDC/167) stress that sense of urgency and seriousness and constitute a stimulus to our political determination to draft and negotiate a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which might well become a turning-point in the history of our times.

It will be particularly gratifying for the Brazilian delegation to participate in such work, as for many years my Government has consistently given its support to every effort aimed at putting an end to the proliferation of nuclear weapons -- in the General Assembly, in the Disarmament Commission, in this Committee and in the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America. We were among the first to support the Irish resolution (A/RES/1665 (XVI)), which was the starting-point in the fight against proliferation. And our adherence to the idea derives both from the peaceful traditions of the Brazilian people and from the conviction that a treaty on non-proliferation would considerably strengthen world security as well as the national security of Brazil.

In adopting resolution 2028 (XX) the General Assembly has conferred upon this Committee a well-defined mandate and at the same time has set forth the principles which should guide the drafting of the treaty on non-proliferation. All these principles -- contained in operative paragraph 2 of that resolution -- are of paramount importance, as the discussions which took place during the last session of the General Assembly showed. But at the present stage of our work I should like to focus our attention on the second principle, which reads:

"(b) The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers".

(A/RES/2028 (XX), ENDC/161)

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For the Brazilian delegation the question of the balance of responsibilities and obligations is one of the basic issues in a non-proliferation treaty. If the responsibilities and obligations were not well balanced and clearly defined, the treaty could become for the non-nuclear Powers an act of renunciation unwarranted by a valid political counterpart.

As early as at the meeting of this Committee held on 17 August last year, my delegation submitted the opinion that the formulae for the treaty -

"... should not regard non-dissemination as an end in itself but should take into account also the effective security of the non-nuclear Powers."

(ENDC/PV.224, p.14)

On the same occasion my delegation stated further:

"While it is necessary to put a stop to any increase in the membership of the nuclear club, the nuclear Powers themselves should undertake to reduce their atomic arsenal, and the non-proliferation measures proposed should take into account the needs of the developing countries in regard to economic and social progress." (ibid.)

It was therefore with satisfaction that the Brazilian delegation joined seven other delegations in signing the Memorandum of 15 September 1965 which refers to this question in the following words:

"A treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself but only a means to an end. That end is the achievement of general and complete disarmament, and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament. The eight delegations are convinced that measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should, therefore, be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery." (ENDC/158)

At the last session of the General Assembly the representative of Brazil, commenting in the First Committee on 22 October 1965 on the concept of "reciprocal responsibility" put forward in the eight-Power memorandum, stressed that -

"... an agreement to stop the spread of nuclear weapons should embody that concept of reciprocal responsibility between nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, and must be followed by concrete measures envisaging the gradual reduction of all nuclear stocks and vehicles." (A/C.1/PV.1359, p.11)

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Another question of great importance was emphasized by the Brazilian delegation in this Committee on 17 August 1965, when we said:

"On the other hand, we are always mindful that, as resolution DC/225 recently reaffirmed, the Eighteen-Nation Committee should keep in mind in its work the principle of converting to programmes of economic and social development of the developing countries a substantial part of the resources gradually released by the reduction of military expenditures. An initiative along these lines would go some way towards meeting the hopes which a large section of world public opinion places in this Conference and would certainly reinforce the machinery for the maintenance of peace envisaged in the United Nations Charter." (ENDC/PV.224, p.13)

An objective and politically valid treaty on non-proliferation should reflect not only the reality of the power relations between the great nuclear Powers, but also the reality of the power relations between these countries and the non-nuclear world.

In the view of the Brazilian delegation, the treaty should be conceived and outlined as part of a programme. Such a programme should be designed to bring about a first and important step towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control and, at the same time, to further the process of the social and economic development of the less-developed countries.

The idea of linking the treaty to a comprehensive programme may be traced back to resolution DC/225, adopted by the Disarmament Commission on 15 June 1965. Indeed, sub-paragraph (c) of operative paragraph 2 of the resolution reads:

"... also accord special priority to the consideration of the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, giving close attention to the various suggestions that agreement could be facilitated by adopting a programme of certain related measures".

(DC/225; ENDC/149)

I am quite aware that, in view of the dramatic urgency of our task, it would not be possible to establish an immediate link between the signature of the treaty and the implementation of a programme of related measures. But if the non-nuclear Powers show their willingness, here and now, to give up the production and the use

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of nuclear weapons, for the benefit of mankind -- and thus for the benefit of the nuclear Powers themselves -- why, I ask myself, cannot the latter show their readiness to offer a counterpart to the signing of the treaty by the non-nuclear Powers?

Why do not the nuclear Powers, along with the treaty, commit themselves, through a declaration of intention, to carrying out a programme based on the following points: first, to take "tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery" (ENDC/158); second, to stop all nuclear weapons tests -- both measures to be taken under adequate international control; third, to increase co-operation with the non-nuclear Powers with a view to accelerating their utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; and fourth, to channel to the developing countries at least part of the savings effected by the aforementioned disarmament steps?

Among the reservations which could be made to the treaty is the fear that the non-nuclear Powers, by signing it, not only might be giving up the possibility of having the most dreadful weapons man's imagination has ever devised, but, at the same time, might be forgoing the benefits which derive from the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The treaty, therefore, should be extremely clear on this point and its implementation, instead of curtailing the possibilities of the non-nuclear countries, should pave the way for ushering them into the nuclear age. The aforementioned declaration of intention would place this problem in a global context and would demonstrate that it is the purpose of the nuclear Powers to intensify and accelerate the exploitation of nuclear energy by the developing nations.

We all know that for many decades the technology achieved as a result of the scientific revolution will, because of its high cost and extreme sophistication, be at the service of only a few countries, which happen to be the nuclear countries. We know also that only the massive application of such technology, including the exploitation of nuclear energy for peaceful uses, will give the necessary impetus to the economic and social development of the developing countries. The treaty on non-proliferation and its related programme could be the first step towards placing

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the scientific revolution at the service of mankind as a whole. If we succeed in doing so, we shall be performing an historical task.

The declaration of intention, made simultaneously with the treaty, would balance the responsibilities and the obligations undertaken by all the contracting parties. The treaty, instead of being a mere act of renunciation, would become a positive political accomplishment. His Holiness Pope Paul VI perhaps had in view the need for projecting the problem with which we are confronted into the broader context of the political reality of our time when he said in his message:

"There is, however, no denying that, with every day that passes, it is becoming more and more obvious that no lasting peace can be established among men until there has been an effective, general and controlled reduction in armaments. With every day that passes, the contrast also becomes more painful and acute between the huge sums being swallowed up by the manufacture of armaments and the immense and growing material distress of over half the human race, whose most elementary needs remain unsatisfied." (ENDC/163, p.3)

As we come to the treaty and consider its features, we can immediately distinguish two fundamental aspects: on the one hand, a non-proliferation agreement proper; on the other, a system of assurances devised fully to protect all the parties to the treaty. The latter should embody clauses relating to safeguards and guarantees, ratification, entry into force, revision and denunciation, drafted in such a way as to create a permanent feeling of security among all signatories and throughout the duration of the treaty. In our view the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency -- or other equivalent international safeguards -- would substantially contribute to that feeling of security and, at the same time, would allow all the contracting parties to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Another question to be contemplated relates to the degree of universality the treaty should have in order to be really effective. The treaty should also envisage the possibility of a non-nuclear weapon country acquiring military nuclear capability. Moreover, we should consider the desirability of limiting the duration of the treaty in order to permit its revision in the light of the results of its application and the progress achieved in the implementation of the related programme.

(Mr. Correa do Lago, Brazil)

The Brazilian delegation has noted with interest the guarantees which the United States and the Soviet Union are prepared to offer to the non-nuclear Powers, as indicated in the messages of President Johnson (ENDC/165) and Premier Kosygin (ENDC/167). We do hope that the debates in this Committee will enable us to identify the various aspects of this question in order to bring the different positions closer together.

These observations result from the conviction that the treaty, in order to be operative, should, in all its phases and throughout its duration, give the parties a constant feeling of security so as completely to eliminate what has been called "the fear of the former fear". Obviously the treaty could not merely represent a pledge of a few nuclear Powers and a few non-nuclear Powers, since our aim is not just to negotiate a treaty on non-proliferation but to achieve non-proliferation through a treaty.

Those were the preliminary remarks on the question of non-proliferation that the delegation of Brazil thought fit to submit to the Committee at this stage of our work. In the course of our debates my delegation will discuss in more detail, when necessary, the various points I have raised today.

One of the greatest statesmen of our century -- Sir Winston Churchill -- coined a well-known phrase: "Arm to parley." It seems, however, that nuclear technology will compel the world to disarm to parley. Yet, in view of the devilish power of nuclear weapons, the world should disarm with extreme caution, because an increase of risk or a reduction of security could have appalling results. But we in this Committee, while keeping in mind all those difficulties, cannot forget that the international community has asked us to help build the world of tomorrow -- a world of hope.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland): First, I should like to join the representatives of the United Kingdom and Brazil in welcoming back the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Protitch, and the leader of the United States delegation, Mr. Fisher.

The purpose of my intervention today -- which I can assure the Committee will be brief -- is to deal with certain points raised at the meeting of the Committee held on 17 February. At that meeting the Committee heard a statement by the

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, in which he attempted to define the basic concepts underlying the United States draft treaty on non-proliferation. According to Mr. Foster, we should start by defining the word "proliferation". He suggested that -

"... proliferation results when a non-nuclear weapon nation acquires its own national capability, or right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the explicit, concurrent decision of an existing nuclear weapon nation." (ENDC/PV.241, pp.34, 35)

Let us examine this definition carefully.

First, I think we have to decide what we mean by the words "nuclear weapon nations" and "non-nuclear weapon nations". According to the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, a "nuclear weapon nation" means a nation possessing nuclear weapons in the sense of -- and here I quote the words of Mr. Burns:

"... complete ownership of the nuclear weapons, sovereign and independent authority over their use, including use in warfare, without necessary reference to any other State ..." (ibid., p.15)

A "non-nuclear weapon nation" would by definition be a nation not endowed with the above-mentioned qualities, a nation not possessing the above-mentioned authority or capability. Therefore the adoption of the United States draft treaty (ENDC/152) would of course prevent such "non-nuclear weapon nations" from becoming "nuclear weapon nations".

However, it is clear that the United States definition of proliferation leaves the door open to different arrangements which, while being consistent with the ban on the acquisition of a national capability or independent ability to fire nuclear weapons, must result in the increase of the number of States able to affect the nuclear balance. It permits different forms of nuclear sharing.

Of course, nuclear sharing is less than possession of nuclear weapons with the sovereign right to use them. But in many cases it may constitute a very important element of implementation of national policies. It may increase the influence of a State among its allies. It may give such a State the possibility of turning the political and military strategies of the alliance in a given direction. It may enable such a State to exert military pressure upon its weaker neighbours, and so forth. And all this can be accomplished through different arrangements --

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

for example, through gaining access to another nation's nuclear weapons, or sharing in the control of nuclear weapons with other nations within the framework of a military grouping.

Furthermore, under the definition offered by Mr. Foster proliferation would occur only if a country gained the capacity to use nuclear weapons — and here I am quoting his words: "without the explicit, concurrent decision of an existing nuclear weapon country." (ENDC/PV.241, p.36). Accordingly, if such a country agreed to accept that limitation, it could gain access to nuclear weapons without violating the spirit and letter of the treaty on non-proliferation. Of course the exact meaning, scope and conditions of application of such a clause must be left open and could be determined only by the parties directly concerned. In other words, in accepting the United States draft we should give the nuclear weapon nations the right to interpret the terms of the treaty arbitrarily, to determine unilaterally what constitutes proliferation, and to enter into special arrangements with non-nuclear weapon nations which would in fact give the latter access to nuclear weapons.

As to the definition of the word "access", which seems to concern the representative of Canada so much, as far as I am concerned I am ready to accept both meanings he suggested on 17 February (ibid., pp.15, 16). In fact the two meanings — first, access as a state of being in physical contact, or being able to be in physical contact, with some object; and secondly, access as a condition enabling somebody to exercise certain functions or deploy certain capacities — are not mutually exclusive; they are complementary. I hope that Mr. Burns will therefore agree with me that nuclear sharing gives its recipients access to wider military and political opportunities. As for my country, it has sufficient reasons to object to any arrangements which would give certain States access to wider military and political opportunities.

It is sometimes argued that such nuclear-sharing arrangements are subject to special conditions and safeguards. I submit that assurances of that nature cannot be a substitute for clear-cut commitments. They cannot satisfy the basic security requirements of those countries which not so long ago had to fight for their existence against the same country which is now officially committed to gaining access in one way or another to nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

In this connexion I should like to make the following remarks. In his statement of 17 February Mr. Foster attempted (ibid., p.36) to convey the impression that the nuclear arrangements contemplated within NATO are prompted by the desire of what he called the Western Europeans to defend themselves against nuclear weapons. It seems to me that Mr. Foster is confusing Western Europe with West Germany. The truth is that the overwhelming majority of the so-called Western Europeans are against the plans for nuclear multilateral forces, which they very rightly identify as attempts to satisfy the nuclear ambitions of the Bonn Government. The truth is that the overwhelming majority of the Western Europeans feel no sense of insecurity, because they know very well that nobody is threatening them. There is no desire among the non-nuclear weapon nations of Western Europe to gain access to nuclear weapons. The sole exception is West Germany.

And it must be emphasized that the policies of the West German Government in this respect have nothing to do with legitimate security preoccupations. Nobody is threatening the security of the German Federal Republic. Nobody is advancing any claims against its national territory. The same, however, cannot be said of the attitude of the West German Government towards its neighbours in Europe. The leaders of the Federal Republic stand committed to the annexation of the German Democratic Republic. They still hope to reshape the map of Europe. They have not given up the idea of restoring the German Reich within its frontiers of 1937.

I must say that I can only regret that the representative of the United Kingdom does not take a more realistic view of the policies of the Bonn Government. I am not going to enter here into a long debate with him. I would only say the following. I hope that Lord Chalfont has read the most recent declaration made by Chancellor Erhard to the West German Press. This declaration contains certain statements which are very relevant to our negotiations. Chancellor Erhard said, according to Press despatches from Bonn, that the so-called McNamara Committee cannot be a substitute for German participation in some form of a multilateral nuclear force. According to those Press despatches he also said, answering a question about the Geneva negotiations and the treaty on non-proliferation, that such a treaty must be subordinated to what he called the "security requirements of West Germany".

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

I leave it to representatives here to interpret these words. Are we to believe that the persistent attempts of the Bonn authorities to enter the nuclear club in one way or another are totally unrelated to the objectives of national policy to which I have already referred? Can it be seriously assumed that we shall agree to sign an international treaty which, instead of arresting the trend toward proliferation of nuclear weapons, gives a legal sanction for nuclear sharing?

We do not expect that the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will by itself solve the problem of European security or the problems arising from the confrontation in Central Europe between the Atlantic Treaty nations and the Warsaw Pact nations. But we think that a treaty drafted along the lines suggested by the USSR delegation (ENDC/164) can do a great deal to facilitate a general détente in Europe and pave the way towards other more comprehensive arrangements in the interest of all-European security and co-operation. We are ready to sign such a treaty. It is now for the Western Powers to reconsider their position and to state unequivocally whether they are willing to follow us on the road toward greater security for all, or whether they are ready to give up the idea of concluding a non-proliferation treaty in order to satisfy the ambitions of their West German ally. The choice is theirs.

I have tried to illustrate the inadequacy of the Western approach to the non-proliferation problem by referring to the European area, which my delegation believes to be of crucial importance in this context. But I am convinced that the limitations of the United States draft imposed by the concept of "national control" and "independent use" are equally harmful when considered from the point of view of the rest of the world. For it is obvious that the wording of articles I and II of the United States draft (ENDC/152) would, if accepted, put the nuclear weapon nations in a position enabling them to extend their sphere of influence by offering nuclear sharing; and if even one nuclear weapon nation decided to take advantage of that opportunity, others would inevitably follow and do the same thing. Many of today's non-aligned nations might be tempted to accept or be pressured into accepting renunciation of their present status in order to gain such access to nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

The whole concept of non-alignment might thereby be placed in jeopardy. One of the major factors of international stability might be lost. The division into military blocs and groupings might become even more widespread. Nuclear-sharing policies might thus contribute towards increasing international tensions by introducing divisive elements into areas which had hitherto withstood the temptations of political alignment.

Thus a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons without loop-holes is in the interest of all States, irrespective of their geographical location. The alternative before us is not "national control" and "independent use" or nuclear sharing. The real alternative is the closing of all avenues leading towards access to nuclear weapons, or nuclear proliferation with all its dangers.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): First, on behalf of the United States delegation, I should like to join those who have welcomed Mr. Protitch back to his accustomed place at the table. I should like also to acknowledge the welcome extended to me by the Chairman and by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Brazil and Poland.

The representative of Poland made some observations concerning the speech of the United States representative at the 241st meeting and concerning the United States draft treaty. I shall refer to those observations at an appropriate time.

I have had the privilege of participating in some of the earlier deliberations of this Committee, but I especially look forward to joining in its work this year. Increasingly the Committee's task has taken on a sense of urgency, owing to the growing threat of nuclear proliferation. My Government is convinced that that threat can be contained, and it is equally convinced that it will be contained through the work of this Committee. As I join you in the difficult task of negotiating a non-proliferation treaty and seeking agreement on other measures to contain the nuclear jinn, I wish to assure you that the United States delegation will continue to act in accordance with President Johnson's appraisal of the non-proliferation problem as "this gravest of all unresolved human issues." (ENDC/153)

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I should like to make a brief remark on the Polish representative's statement. It was divided into two parts. The first part referred to our Western concept of non-dissemination, and the United States representative, who was extensively quoted, has just informed us that he will reply at an appropriate time. But the second part related in particular to Western Europe, of which my country forms a part. As I see it, this statement constitutes a fresh attempt by an Eastern delegation to divide the Western allies and to emphasize contrasts and divisions which do not exist. I must say that we in the West are accustomed to this policy. Unfortunately, several of the proposals made by the Eastern delegations are clearly designed to divide the Western allies and have no other aim.

In regard to the remarks made by Mr. Blusztajn this morning, obviously I can only speak for my own country, since I do not represent the other countries of Western Europe. But as far as Italy is concerned I must point out that our position has been clearly set forth on several occasions in this Committee. Accordingly I would refer the Polish representative to the verbatim records of this Conference and ask him to study again the statements made by my delegation, particularly those concerning the points to which he has referred. These statements clearly indicate the Italian attitude to the problem of non-dissemination and "nuclear sharing".

The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): Speaking as representative of Ethiopia, I should like to read a message addressed by my august Sovereign, His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I, to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It reads as follows:

"We have learnt that His Excellency the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR has addressed a message to your Commission signifying the willingness of the USSR Government to engage itself not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states parties to the treaty, which have no nuclear weapons in their territory and accordingly requesting other nuclear powers to do the same. We had also learnt that the President of the United States had declared to the nations that do not seek the nuclear path an assurance that they will have the strong support of the United States against nuclear blackmail, and proposing to strengthen the United Nations and other international security arrangements. In view of the fact that the present

(The Chairman, Ethiopia)

nuclear possession and proliferation could be a serious danger to the security of mankind, we believe that such a commitment against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, by all nuclear powers, would help to make a great step forward in the attempt to reach an agreement on disarmament.

"We therefore appeal to the Committee to give serious consideration to the proposal to having a joint resolution to include all the Nuclear Powers in accordance with the principles set out by the United Nations resolution for a non-proliferation treaty."

I would ask the Secretariat to be kind enough to circulate that message as a document of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.^{1/}

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 244th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Amha Abera, representative of Ethiopia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Brazil, Poland, the United States, Italy and Ethiopia.

"The delegation of Ethiopia tabled a message from His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday 3 March 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.

^{1/} Circulated as document ENDC/171